What is "liberal international order"?
- Short version of "Policy Brief: What is the Liberal International Order?"
by Hans Kundnani, May 3, 2017
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/what-liberal-international-order
Although the phrase “liberal international order” is widely used, it is far from self-explanatory.
Does this refer to political liberalism (in opposition to authoritarianism)?
Or economic liberalism (in opposition to economic nationalism or mercantilism)?
Or liberalism in the sense that international relations theorists use it (in opposition to realism and other theories of international relations)?
The easy answer is that it refers to all three — because they go hand in hand.
As John Ikenberry has shown, the current international order is actually a kind of fusion of two distinct order-building projects: firstly the modern state system, a project dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648; and secondly the liberal order, which over the last two centuries was led by the United Kingdom and the United States and which in the twentieth century was aided by the “liberal ascendancy” — that is, rise of liberal democratic states.
The “liberal vision” of Western democracies, on the other hand, included “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, [and] the rule of law.”[6]
The principles set out in the Atlantic Charter included peace and security (including the right to self-defense and the preservation of the territorial status quo), self-governance (self-rule, open societies, the rule of law), economic prosperity (economic advancement, improved labor standards, social welfare), and free trade and the preservation of the global commons.
Elements of Liberal International Order
A straightforward typology of the liberal international order might include three elements: the security order, the economic order, and the human rights order.
1) The Security Order
Ikenberry writes that an order that is liberal in the sense of being “rules-based” contrasts with one that is “organized into rival blocs or exclusive regional spheres.”[14]
2) The Economic Order
It is implicitly to the economic order that Western analysts refer when they speak of an “open” liberal international order. Thus Ikenberry writes that “openness is manifest when states trade and exchange on the basis of mutual gain” — in other words, when economic relations between states are organized on the basis of liberal principles.
3) The Human Rights Order
The human rights order goes back to the United Nations Charter, which “reaffirmed faith in fundamental human rights, and dignity and worth of the human person” and committed all member states to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
It now seems, in other words, as if by seeking to develop the human rights order, the West undermined the security order. Put differently, by trying to make the liberal international order more “liberal,” the West undermined order. This illustrates that there can be a tension between “liberalism” and “order.”
Western and Non-Western Perceptions
The liberal international order is not simply a cynical cover for the interests of Europe and the United States, as some outside the geographic West believe.
The best example of this idealized view is the economic order. Liberal economists like to see trade in “win-win” terms and believe that the liberalization of trade is therefore a kind of public good. trade agreements like TTIP and TPP sought to set the “rules” for trade in the 21st century.
The easy answer is that it refers to all three — because they go hand in hand.
As John Ikenberry has shown, the current international order is actually a kind of fusion of two distinct order-building projects: firstly the modern state system, a project dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648; and secondly the liberal order, which over the last two centuries was led by the United Kingdom and the United States and which in the twentieth century was aided by the “liberal ascendancy” — that is, rise of liberal democratic states.
The “liberal vision” of Western democracies, on the other hand, included “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, [and] the rule of law.”[6]
The principles set out in the Atlantic Charter included peace and security (including the right to self-defense and the preservation of the territorial status quo), self-governance (self-rule, open societies, the rule of law), economic prosperity (economic advancement, improved labor standards, social welfare), and free trade and the preservation of the global commons.
Elements of Liberal International Order
A straightforward typology of the liberal international order might include three elements: the security order, the economic order, and the human rights order.
1) The Security Order
Ikenberry writes that an order that is liberal in the sense of being “rules-based” contrasts with one that is “organized into rival blocs or exclusive regional spheres.”[14]
2) The Economic Order
It is implicitly to the economic order that Western analysts refer when they speak of an “open” liberal international order. Thus Ikenberry writes that “openness is manifest when states trade and exchange on the basis of mutual gain” — in other words, when economic relations between states are organized on the basis of liberal principles.
3) The Human Rights Order
The human rights order goes back to the United Nations Charter, which “reaffirmed faith in fundamental human rights, and dignity and worth of the human person” and committed all member states to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
It now seems, in other words, as if by seeking to develop the human rights order, the West undermined the security order. Put differently, by trying to make the liberal international order more “liberal,” the West undermined order. This illustrates that there can be a tension between “liberalism” and “order.”
Western and Non-Western Perceptions
The liberal international order is not simply a cynical cover for the interests of Europe and the United States, as some outside the geographic West believe.
The best example of this idealized view is the economic order. Liberal economists like to see trade in “win-win” terms and believe that the liberalization of trade is therefore a kind of public good. trade agreements like TTIP and TPP sought to set the “rules” for trade in the 21st century.
But supporters of these trade agreements often fail to see how those rules — for example on intellectual property rights — might be skewed in favor of the most developed countries. As a result, some outside the West saw TPP as “geo-economic containment” not just of China but of emerging economies more generally.[28]
Conclusion
